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Abstract 
The conceptions of time are manifold (cyclic, linear, subjective/objective etc.). This is also true of 
Ancient Greece (Lloyd 1976). However, in Classical Greece certain human sciences arise and 
evolve at the same time, including History (Herodotus, Thucydides) and Philosophy (Plato, 
Aristotle), which may share a common notion of time. We explore the idea that these developments 
are related to what we observe in the language in the same period, namely that the marking of 
aspect and mood steps back and gives way to a more precise marking of time in the verbal system. 
This may be due to mutual influences of the categories of language and thought, as already 
observed in Benveniste (1958). 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
Classical Greece (500-400 BCE) was a period of scientific activity (although the term may seem 
anachronistic), so much so that speaking of “second Greek miracle1” would not be an 
exaggeration. Indeed, it gave rise to, or radically changed, medicine, history, philosophy… The 
changes were particularly important in the domain of social science. The radical nature and the 
importance of this period are even more marked since they happened at such a quick pace. As 
we will see, during this period categories of thought could evolve in one or two generations. 
                                                             
1 The expression “Greek Miracle”, coined by Ernest Renan, designates the moment of the rise of rational 
thinking in Ancient Greece (7th-6th Centuries BCE, Vernant 1962). One of the major changes between the two 
periods is found in the passage from reflections concerning nature to reflections concerning man (Vernant 
1985: 19-85). 
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Furthermore, the link between the changes is not coincidental. The circumstances – notably 
political – which were favorable to this innovation were identified. 
Still, certain common developments remain unexplained. This is the case of the conception of 
time. Indeed, during this period it developed both in the domain of history as well as philosophy. 
In this article, we would like to make a double hypothesis. First these developments influenced 
each other to such an extent that the idea that “there is no Greek conception of time” (Lloyd 
1975: 205-14) is not tenable if we consider a given time period. More generally, our study 
contributes to the way in which time is conceptualized by human beings in different registers of 
thought.  
Second, we would like to make a connection between these changes of the conception of time 
and linguistic evolution, and explore the idea that there may be mutual, unconscious influence 
on the two modes of categorization, in the line of Benveniste (1958).2 In fact, it can be shown 
that grammatical treatment of time in the verbal system changed rapidly during this period.3  
After introducing the methodological difficulties, we first provide an analysis of the conception 
of time in philosophy and history. Then we will compare the results and attempt to see if they 
are reducible to a shared notion of time, even while keeping in mind that categories of thought 
in different disciplines are not always readily translated. Finally, we will examine the changes 
in linguistic treatment of time before comparing the results with those obtained from the 
comparison of philosophy and history.  
II   METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES 
Several difficulties should be mentioned before treating our question. The first lies in the 
multiple concepts used for explaining time: continuous/discontinuous, cyclic/linear, 
deterministic, teleological, constant, eternal, subjective/objective, physical/human, 
psychological,4 etc. We see in particular that the different pairs of antonyms are not reducible 
one to the other. Thus, the cyclic or linear aspect of time seems to be independent from its 
continuous or discontinuous aspect, and we can a priori envisage concepts derived from the 
combination of those different elements.  
Another difficulty is that of the sources of our study; in particular we lack lengthy texts before 
the Classical period, which prevents us from easily determining a terminus post quem, that is to 
say the birth of a concept. We will limit ourselves to determining termini ante quem. 
Finally, chronology is also an obstacle for our hypothesis, as can be shown on the basis of 
Table 1. 
  
                                                             
2 Since the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Whorf 1956), the study of the relation between language and the 
conception of the world has changed. It progressively moved from the domain of lexical categories to that of 
grammatical categories. Benveniste (1958) showed how Aristotle’s categorization depends on the categories 
of the Greek language. 
3 Linguists consider that a rapid modification of a given parameter occurs over the course of three or four 
generations (Labov 2010: 389). 
4 This category seems particularly anachronistic for Ancient Greece. 
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Century History Philosophy 
Fifth (1) Herodotus Presocratics 
Fifth (2) Thucydides  
Fourth (1) Xenophon Plato 
Fourth (2)  Aristotle 
Third  Stoics, 
Hellenistic 
schools 
Second Polybus  
Table 1. Chronology of the different studied authors 
 
As can be seen, the authors considered for each discipline are not exactly contemporaneous. We 
will also see that the changes cannot be situated at the same moment in time from a discipline to 
another. In addition, we only have one or two authors per concept and per period. It is thus only 
globally that a change in the conception of time can be observed, with successive or indirect 
influences. With these caveats, we can move onto the study discipline by discipline. 
III   PHILOSOPHY 
3.1   The Presocratics 
Among the first rank of thinkers known as “Presocratics” is Anaximander, as suggested by 
Heidegger in the text titled “Anaximander's Saying” (1950). His texts are among some of the 
first “philosophical” writings in prose.5 He treated the definition of “the principle of things which 
are”: 
“Anaximander said that the principle and element of beings is the unlimited. (…) And the things 
out of which birth comes about for beings, into these too their destruction happens, according to 
obligation: for they pay the penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to 
the order of time.” (D6 Laks-Most = Fr.1,6 Ἀναξίµανδρος ἀρχήν τε καὶ στοιχεῖον εἴρηκε τῶν 
ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον. (…) ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι 
κατὰ τὸ χρεών. διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου 
τάξιν) 
The Milesians recognize universal change, but not without order: Anaximander, in the view of 
Favorinus, came to Sparta to build or adjust gnomons. A way of measuring time by shadow, 
gnomons or sundials places the periodic taking of time into the nascent philosophy, a cosmic 
rhythm of shadow and light where the alternation of periodic time is a part of a potentially 
unchanging repetition.  
The cyclic periodicity that punctuates the world is at the heart of the thinking of Empedocles, 
and related to the well-known principled duality of love and hate (cf. Fr. 16, Fr. 17):  
“For these are all equal and identical in age, but each one presides over a different honor, each 
one has its own character, and by turns they dominate while the time revolves. And besides 
                                                             
5 According to the acount of Themistius (Orationes, 36, 317): Anaximander lived between 610 and 546 BCE. 
6 All translations in this Section are taken from André Laks’ and Glenn Most’s edition (Early Greek 
Philosophy, Nine volumes, In collaboration with Gérard Journée and assisted by Leopoldo Iribarren and David 
Lévystone, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016). Numbering of the fragments as in 
this edition, followed by the concordance with the former reference edition (Diels-Kranz). 
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these, nothing at all is added nor is lacking.” (D73, v. 36-38 = Fr.17, ταῦτα γὰρ ἶσά τε πάντα καὶ 
ἥλικα γένναν ἔασι, τιµῆς δ’ ἄλλης ἄλλο µέδει, πάρα δ’ ἦθος ἑκάστωι, ἐν δὲ µέρει κρατέουσι 
περιπλοµένοιο χρόνοιο. καὶ πρὸς τοῖς οὔτ’ ἄρ τι ἐπιγίνεται οὐδ’ ἀπολήγει) 
As for the Pythagoreans, they did not completely renounce the cyclic dimension, which took on 
aspects of the astronomical Great Year, and the conclusion of which the stars return to their 
initial position.  
It was Parmenides, the “father” of all discourse on being according to Plato’s Sophist, for whom 
in time could be found rather more of a representation than a principle of order. Plato described 
the Eleatics as positing an immutable being, entirely homogeneous, with no difference in itself, 
and from which movement, change and time are necessarily excluded. Change and time are, 
with birth and becoming, reintroduced into Parmenides’ Poem as objects of opinion, which gives 
us something like physics: 
“In this way, according to opinion, these things have been born and now they are, and later, 
having grown strong, starting from that point they will come to their end. For these things, 
humans have established a name that designates each one.” (D62 = Fr.19, οὕτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν 
ἔφυ τάδε καί νυν ἔασι καὶ µετέπειτ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε τελευτήσουσι τραφέντα· τοῖς δ’ ὄνοµ’ ἄνθρωποι 
κατέθεντ’ ἐπίσηµον ἑκάστωι) 
As far as Heraclitus is concerned, Plato and Aristotle contributed to give an expression of his 
ideas in direct opposition to those of Parmenides. But he cannot be reduced to notions of flow 
or pure fate except for quite distantly. He is said to have taught that the world is a place of 
transformations (D86 = Fr. 31). However, the idea of One – or of All – “unbegotten”, 
“immortal”, and that of “eternity” are not unfamiliar to him (D46 = Fr. 50). It should be 
understood that “Changing, it remains at rest” (D58 = Fr. 84, µεταϐάλλον ἀναπαύεται). Time, a 
place of conflict, of opposition, presides over the game of opposites: “A lifetime is a child 
playing, playing checkers: the kingship belongs to a child” (D76 = Fr. 52, αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι παίζων, 
πεσσεύων· παιδὸς ἡ βασιληίη). And the eternity of One or All is not limited to Parmenides’ 
thinking: in Heraclitus the idea of an eternal world can be seen. However, this comes with time 
understood as a cyclic process, an ordered succession of phrases or periods. Thus, fragment D85 
(= Fr. 30): 
“This world order, the same for all, none of the gods or humans made it, but it always was and 
is and will be: fire ever-living, kindled in measures and extinguished in measures.” (κόσµον 
τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ 
ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόµενον µέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύµενον µέτρα). 
The cyclic character of Becoming, which reigns by games or by opposition, characterizes time: 
“There is the same within, what is living and what is dead, what is awake and what is sleeping, 
and what is young and what is old. For these, changing, are those, and those, changing in turn, 
are these.” (D68 = Fr. 88, τεθνηκὸς καὶ [τὸ] ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε 
γὰρ µεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κἀκεῖνα πάλιν µεταπεσόντα ταῦτα) 
This cyclic temporal character can be understood as specific to the soul or the cosmos. In each, 
combat, and measuring, give time its cyclic and periodic character. 
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Beyond their differences, and despite the doubt due to the fragmentary nature of our sources, the 
Presocratic notion of time is based on cycles and eternity. These categories are rethought and 
reoriented by Plato and Aristotle, in particular with greater attention to change. 
3.2   Plato 
Scholarly interest has especially focused on Plato’s conception of astronomical time as related 
to eternity, as it is central to his thought. But Karel Thein (2000, 2001) has shown that there is 
also a notion of political and human time. We will examine each of these two kinds of time.  
One passage is central in the platonic conception of astronomical time, although its interpretation 
is difficult. That is Timaeus 37d-38b : 
“And when the Father that engendered it perceived it in motion and alive, a thing of joy to the 
eternal gods, He too rejoiced: and being well-pleased He designed to make it resemble its Model 
still more closely. Accordingly, seeing that that Model is an eternal Living Creature, He set about 
making this Universe, so far as He could, of a like kind. But inasmuch as the nature of the Living 
Creature was eternal, this quality it was impossible to attach in its entirety to what is generated; 
wherefore He planned to make a movable image of Eternity, and, as He set in order the Heaven, 
of that Eternity which abides in unity He made an eternal image, moving according to 
number, even that which we have named Time. For simultaneously with the construction of 
the Heaven He contrived the production of days and nights and months and years, which existed 
not before the Heaven came into being. And these are all portions of Time; even as “Was” and 
“Shall be” are generated forms of Time, although we apply them wrongly, without noticing, to 
Eternal Being. For we say that it “is” or “was” or “will be,” whereas, in truth of speech, “is’ 
alone is the appropriate term; “was” and “will be,” on the other hand, are terms properly 
applicable to the Becoming which proceeds in Time, since both of these are motions; but it 
belongs not to that which is ever changeless in its uniformity to become either older or younger 
through time, nor ever to have become so, nor to be so now, nor to be about to be so hereafter, 
nor in general to be subject to any of the conditions which Becoming has attached to the things 
which move in the world of Sense, these being generated forms of Time, which imitates Eternity 
and circles round according to number. And besides these we make use of the following 
expressions, ‒ that what is become is become, and what is becoming is becoming, and what is 
about to become is about to become, and what is non-existent is non-existent; but none of these 
expressions is accurate. But the present is not, perhaps, a fitting occasion for an exact discussion 
of these matters.” (tr. R. G. Bury7) 
Ὡς δὲ κινηθὲν αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνόησεν τῶν ἀιδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλµα ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ, 
ἠγάσθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς ἔτι δὴ µᾶλλον ὅµοιον πρὸς τὸ παράδειγµα ἐπενόησεν (d) 
ἀπεργάσασθαι. Καθάπερ οὖν αὐτὸ τυγχάνει ζῷον ἀίδιον ὄν, καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν οὕτως εἰς δύναµιν 
ἐπεχείρησε τοιοῦτον ἀποτελεῖν. Ἡ µὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῴου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος, καὶ τοῦτο 
µὲν δὴ τῷ γεννητῷ παντελῶς προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν· εἰκὼ δ’ ἐπενόει κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος 
ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσµῶν ἅµα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ µένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατ’ ἀριθµὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον 
εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνοµάκαµεν. (e) ἡµέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ µῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτούς, 
οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅµα ἐκείνῳ συνισταµένῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν µηχανᾶται· 
ταῦτα δὲ πάντα µέρη χρόνου, καὶ τό τ’ ἦν τό τ’ ἔσται χρόνου γεγονότα εἴδη, ἃ δὴ φέροντες 
λανθάνοµεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀίδιον οὐσίαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς. Λέγοµεν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἦν ἔστιν τε καὶ ἔσται, τῇ δὲ 
                                                             
7 Plato in Twelve Volumes: Vol. 9. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann 
Ltd. 1929. 
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τὸ ἔστιν µόνον κατὰ τὸν 38. (a) ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει, τὸ δὲ ἦν τό τ’ ἔσται περὶ τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ 
γένεσιν ἰοῦσαν πρέπει λέγεσθαι—κινήσεις γάρ ἐστον, τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον ἀκινήτως οὔτε 
πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον προσήκει γίγνεσθαι διὰ χρόνου οὐδὲ γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐδὲ γεγονέναι 
νῦν οὐδ’ εἰς αὖθις ἔσεσθαι, τὸ παράπαν τε οὐδὲν ὅσα γένεσις τοῖς ἐν αἰσθήσει φεροµένοις 
προσῆψεν, ἀλλὰ χρόνου ταῦτα αἰῶνα µιµουµένου καὶ κατ’ ἀριθµὸν κυκλουµένου γέγονεν 
εἴδη—καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι τὰ τοιάδε, (b) τό τε γεγονὸς εἶναι γεγονὸς καὶ τὸ γιγνόµενον εἶναι 
γιγνόµενον, ἔτι τε τὸ γενησόµενον εἶναι γενησόµενον καὶ τὸ µὴ ὂν µὴ ὂν εἶναι, ὧν οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς 
λέγοµεν. Περὶ µὲν οὖν τούτων τάχ’ ἂν οὐκ εἴη καιρὸς πρέπων ἐν τῷ παρόντι διακριβολογεῖσθαι. 
In this crucial text, Plato forms a relation between the heavens (and the divine) and a world in 
movement which includes the stars and the human and terrestrial world. The heavens are eternal 
(αἰών, ἀεί, ἀίδιον, ἀώνιον) and not subject to change. The terrestrial world, on the other hand, is 
subject to modification, which is made clear in the text by the word-play of the terms with the 
root γεν- ‘to be born, to become’ (birth, death, change, etc.). Change is intrinsically tied to time. 
The former domain thus escapes corruption (change and degradation), but the latter does not. 
Another characteristic tied to the temporal nature of the world “born/become” is its possibility 
of moving, its mobility (radical κινέ-).8 Thus the stars can serve as intermediaries since they 
share the longevity of the heavens and the mobile character of the Earth. Finally, change and 
mobility have the property of being measurable (κατ’ ἀριθµόν). 
The perceptible world (τοῖς ἐν αἰσθήσει φεροµένοις) then is deprived of the perfection of the 
immutable eternal (µένοντος αἰῶνος). Nevertheless, to a certain extent it participates in eternity 
through the intermediary of time, in that there exists an image of eternity, εἰκὼ αἰῶνος, that is 
time itself.9 Indeed, the phenomena which permit time to be measured and the perception of 
change (“days, nights, months, years,” ἡµέρας καὶ νύκτας καὶ µῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτούς) are celestial 
phenomena. Yet the vault of the heavens is the location of eternity. Celestial phenomena are thus 
an image of eternity, since they are an image of the heavens. And the time that they manifest can 
thus be seen as a mobile and measurable image of the eternal. In this way, if time is corrupting, 
it is also a way of acceding to eternity, to the divine and to Ideas, which cannot be directly 
perceived. In particular since, as argues Lloyd (1975), “Endless time is as close as perceptible 
things can get to eternity”. 
This analysis should not mask the fact that time is also the cause of corruption.10 However, it 
leads us to reevaluate the idea that the platonic approach to time is only negative, in particular 
since time, being measurable and thus subject to number, is also order (διακοσµῶν, in particular 
see the analyses of Brague 1982). In addition, mankind’s life – that is to say the soul’s stay in 
the body – which is brief and is thus essentially nothing when faced with eternity or the long 
term, can participate in long periods or rather total time (πᾶς χρόνος) thanks to the city, which 
                                                             
8 The relation between movement and temporality can in reality be considered to be more complex. Brague 
(1982: 54) in particular argues for the idea that “[the perceptible] is totally outside the domain within which 
the difference between time and eternity is relevant. As such, it shows rather pure separation, from the “place” 
(chôra) which is not yet specified in spatial or temporal terms.” The study of this idea of “pure separation” 
would carry us too far of course and we leave it for future work. 
9 A somewhat different interpretation in Thein (2017), for whom the image of eternity is constituted of the 
stars/planets, which move following the numbers of time. This interesting equation (time=numbers) is 
nevertheless unexpected when the passage χρόνου κατ’ ἀριθµὸν κυκλουµένου, is considered; where time 
circulates conforming to numbers and not as numbers. 
10 Notably in the political domain, see Thein (2000).  
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lasts over the long term even if political regimes change; and thanks to the immortal soul, which 
comes out of Thein’s (2001) analysis of the Republic. 
This conception of time evolves with Aristotle and Hellenistic thought. In particular, the views 
on change are modified. 
3.3   Aristotle 
Let us take as our starting point the following passage from Physics: 
“Accordingly, when we perceive a ‘now’ in isolation, that is to say not as one of the two, an 
initial and a final one in the motion, nor yet as being a final ‘now’ of one period and at the same 
time the initial ‘now’ of a succeeding period, then no time seems to have elapsed, for neither has 
there been any corresponding motion. But when we perceive a distinct before and after, then we 
speak of time: for this is just what time is, the calculable measure or dimension of motion with 
respect to before-and-afterness.” (Physique, IV, 11, 219a-b, tr. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. 
Cornford11, Ὅταν µὲν οὖν ὡς ἓν τὸ νῦν αἰσθανώµεθα, καὶ µὴ ἤτοι ὡς πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν 
τῇ κινήσει ἢ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ µὲν προτέρου δὲ καὶ ὑστέρου τινός, οὐ δοκεῖ χρόνος γεγονέναι οὐθείς, 
ὅτι οὐδὲ κίνησις. ῞Οταν δὲ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, τότε λέγοµεν χρόνον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ 
χρόνος, ἀριθµὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον) 
Here, Aristotle uses the same ingredients as Plato: perceptible character (αἰσθανώµεθα), 
movement (κίνησις), number (ἀριθµός). But he reverses things. Time is no longer itself mobility. 
For sure, it is “something of movement”, but it no longer dissolves in a purely qualitative and 
irrational change, a flux that eludes measurement. Time is “numbered number”, which 
movement allows to be measured, as well as an objective way for the soul to perceive change 
according to what came before and comes after. Aristotle adds: time is “that by which movement 
has a number”. Further, movement is a sign (σηµεῖον) which permits the identification and 
measurement of time. When Aristotle questions the nature of the reality of time in things, or in 
the soul, his response has two parts (Physics IV, 11, 219 b 1-3): there is certainly time in things, 
but as in potency; this time is not determined when it is felt by an act of the soul which 
distinguishes “now” in accordance with the before and the after.  
What is more, time is tied to change (before-after, πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον). But change does not 
have the same status for Aristotle as for Plato. While Plato links change and corruption (see the 
preceding section), for Aristotle, change is seen as the deployment of actual properties and of 
properties present in potency in an object. Time is thus the condition of implementation and it is 
an indispensable aspect of causality. Causal relations, by allowing us to explain facts, themselves 
call back to the reality of time; that which is not yet can in part be, if not predicted (Posterior 
Analytics, II, 12), at least anticipated: We can know by inference a past event from a more recent 
event, and we can anticipate on one hand what is the result of necessary relations of cause and 
effect, and on the other hand that which is produced “the most often”, by general rule (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 
πολύ, cf. Physics IV, 10-14, but also part 4 [but embedded reference] on historians). The reality 
of time is no more inherent – as it was for Plato – in a radically inferior degree of reality; but 
rather is articulated, currently, in the reality of the possible, or even in the power which is made 
real according to a relation of the before to the after. Time is thus not a sign of lesser being, but 
on the contrary, an implementation of the possible, an actualization of form and intelligibility. 
                                                             
11 Aristotle in 23 Volumes: Vol. 4. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann 
Ltd. 1929. 
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3.4   Summary 
Conceptions of time in philosophy evolved from a notion of cyclic time for some of the 
Presocratics, in particular Heraclitus, to a more complex notion in Plato and Aristotle, who 
consider both a long enduring, cosmic time related to eternity, and a more human or terrestrial 
time, tied to change. Historians, on their side, by the very nature of the object of their study, 
focus more on human time, even if elements of conception of divine time can be read from 
between the lines. 
IV   HISTORY12 
In this section, we examine Herodotus and Thucydides in turn. 
4.1   Herodotus 
Herodotus’ aim was to write a history of the relation between the East and the West over a long 
period of time. His Histories, while meeting this objective, also contain digressions which allow 
the reader to travel and compare different civilizations around the Mediterranean, while at the 
same time alluding to conceptions of time which he does not necessarily take into account.  
 According to him, man is essentially the subject of time and vicissitudes which come 
along with it (Solon says πᾶσά ἐστι ἄνθρωπος συµφορή, “man is but unhappiness”, in I, 32). He 
does not have access to eternity, at least in the timeless platonic sense. Still, he can have an idea 
of it thanks to the long term. It should be noted here that for Herodotus this seems to be associated 
with ethical conduct, perhaps because it is close to the time of the gods.13 This long term can 
stay purely human, for example in matters of the attainment of glory, or of maintaining customs, 
two concepts that have meaning for following generations. Thus in VI, 109, Miltiades uses the 
argument of glory to convince Callimachus “(to) leave such a memorial for all posterity as was 
left not even by Harmodius and Aristogiton” (tr. A. D. Godley,14 µνηµόσυνον λιπέσθαι ἐς τὸν 
ἅπαντα ἀνθρώπων βίον οἷον οὐδὲ Ἁρµόδιός τε καὶ Ἀριστογείτων). 
But true permanence is found in meteorological and astronomical phenomena. This is the case 
of Egypt in particular, where the absence of change goes along with health:  
“Even without this, the Egyptians are the healthiest of all men, next to the Libyans; the reason 
of which to my thinking is that the climate in all seasons is the same.” (II, 77, tr. A. D. Godley, 
op. cit., Εἰσὶ µὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως Αἰγύπτιοι µετὰ Λίϐυας ὑγιηρέστατοι πάντων ἀνθρώπων τῶν 
ὡρέων ἐµοὶ δοκέειν εἵνεκεν, ὅτι οὐ µεταλλάσσονται αἱ ὦραι) 
Men also lean on duration/astronomical timelessness to give weight to their actions, in particular 
to their oaths: 
“As long as the sun holds the course whereby he now goes, we will make no agreement with 
Xerxes.” (VIII, 143, tr. A. D. Godley, op. cit., Ἔστ’ ἂν ὁ ἥλιος τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἴῃ τῇ περ καὶ νῦν 
ἔρχεται, µήκοτε ὁµολογήσειν ἡµέας Ξέρξῃ) 
                                                             
12 The bulk of the material in this section is based on Golfin (1999, 2000, 2003). See also Momigliano (1966).  
13 Still the historian does not pretend to deal with it, aside from quite occasionally, because it is too distant, and 
thus unknowable, which demonstrates both religious deference and heuristic prudence. See Darbo-Peschanski 
(1987: 25-38) for a history of the question. 
14 Herodotus in Four Volumes. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 
1920-1925. 
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The long term, and even more when tied to natural phenomena, is a guarantee or a remedy against 
change and the damage that time can do to men. Herodotus made a distinction between time-
destruction/eternity-continuity. Still, this eternity is not out of time, it is not immobile. It lasts 
infinitely long, a procession of similar moments, translated by the expression (ἐς) τὸν ἅπαντα 
χρόνον, “lit for the whole time = forever.”15 
Is there, then, a place for supernatural and intemporal eternity? Herodotus says nothing about 
this, other than recounting the beliefs of certain peoples as a kind of metempsychosis. Thus the 
Egyptians think that the human soul, being immortal, after the death of the body runs a circuit 
(περιήλυσιν) and passes into all other living beings before entering once again into a human 
body (II, 123). In the same way, the historian finds it remarkable that the Getae “believe 
themselves immortal” (᾿Αθανατίζουσι) in the sense that their dead join the divine incarnate in 
Zalmoxis (IV, 93-96). 
Further, although he writes a chronologically ordered history that explains the manner in which 
the Greeks were led to confrontation with the Persians, Herodotus also develops time with cyclic 
aspects since it is built on repetition. Following other critics, K. Wesselmann (2011; 2016: 205-
14) shows that Herodotean accounts obey a limited number of models or explanatory archetypes 
that can be categorized (kidnapping of women, exposing of children with exceptional destinies, 
predictions, acts of pride. . .). In this way, the accounts are like myths and it can be concluded 
that History as written by Herodotus is atemporal.  
Nevertheless, the importance given by the historian to the long term and to the origin of things 
prevents us from saying that historical time, the free will of men, happenstance, are removed 
from his study. Not everything is predetermined. The victory of the Greeks at Salamis was 
certainly not anticipated by Xerxes’ Persians. Even more, we have to put Greece at the beginning 
of the 5th Century BCE into context, being characterized by the development of rationalism, and 
consider that myth participates in history, since Herodotus’ intention is to explore the depths of 
the past. Myth here is thus indispensable to knowledge of this ancient past. Thucydides himself 
– a historian who passes for the model of rationalism – sometimes has recourse to myth.16 
4.2   Thucydides 
The history written by Thucydides is rather different from that of Herodotus, since it is concerned 
with explaining why and how the war between Athens and Sparta touched the entirety of the 
Greek world. In contrast to Herodotus, we are dealing with a history which covers a relatively 
brief period (431-404) and is exclusively centered on the Hellenic world. Yet, Thucydides also 
adopts the long term in that he writes in book I, in Archaeology, a synthesis of Greek history 
since its beginning up to the Greco-Persian wars. The synthesis consists in showing that, from 
the beginning and up to the 5th century, the Greek cities and regions developed by growing their 
power through exchange, wars, and technical innovation (Romilly 1956). 
Some scholars have also suggested a notion of eternity for Thucydides. But it is quite different 
from that of Herodotus. As we saw, Herodotus believed in an eternity which was in reality rather 
a continuity or a stability. The traces of eternity in Thucydides were instead more like return and 
                                                             
15 See for example II, 13, where Herodotus uses τὸν πάντα χρόνον τὸν ἐπίλοιπον to describe what the 
consequences of stopping the flooding of the Nile would be “for the rest of time”. 
16 For example in the history of Sicily, VI, 1 and 2 especially. 
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repeating cycles. This is the position argued for by M. Finley in his essay on the author (1942). 
Thus, in VIII, 5, 1, Thucydides makes the following observation:  
“While both sides were carrying out these measures and busily equipping themselves for the war 
precisely as if they were just beginning it, …” (tr. C. F. Smith,17 Πρασσόντων δὲ ταῦτα 
ἀµφοτέρων καὶ ὄντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχοµένων ἐν κατασκευῇ τοῦ πολέµου) 
Still, the traces of cyclicity that can be found in Thucydides are not the proof that he had a notion 
of eternity like that of the “eternal return”, as we have tried to show (Golfin 2003). The 
connections that he observed are due to his rationalizing, and demonstrate sometimes more of a 
literary construction than a return to the same. Rather, it is the steadiness of laws, in particular 
in the domain of human behavior, which gives the impression of the return of a cyclic eternity. 
For Thucydides there exists human nature and laws that govern the relation between cities – 
founded on a relation of force – which make, even if time does not repeat itself, an analogy 
between the past, the present, and the future exists. From whence the possibility of good 
government or good strategy to predict the future (Romilly 1990). In a nutshell, 
“Thucydides never makes the mistake of reducing different developments or processes or decline 
to fixed courses of evolution. Certainly, there are similarities between the situations but each one 
is unique. (…) The repetition of history is of a politico-philosophical nature, that is to say, power 
games, which is the basis of Thucydides’ analysis, but not of the course of time, every event 
being original.”18 (Golfin 2003: 20) 
If we adopt another point of view on the matters of time and history, we can see the past takes 
on a significance and cannot be reconstructed except in function of what happened next. It is 
known and judged in light of the present, that is to say the writer’s present – where it is finished 
and where it can be put into perspective. Thucydides does not judge the importance of the 
Peloponnesian War in relation to wars from the past until it is well underway, or even until it is 
over. Thus the past is tied to the present and to the future (Marcaccini 2017). 
Even if there is a power imbalance that leads cities to make war either for increasing their power 
or for countering the power of another dominating neighbor,19 the role of the unexpected is 
central to Thucydides. History is not deterministic. It is particularly clear in the episode of the 
plague of 430-426, recounted in book II where Pericles expresses himself thus: 
“Now that a great reverse has come upon you without any warning, you are too dejected in mind 
to persevere in your former resolutions. For the spirit is cowed by that which is sudden and 
unexpected and happens contrary to all calculation; and this is precisely the experience that you 
                                                             
17 Thucydides in Four Volumes. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 
1919-1923. 
18 “Jamais Thucydide ne tombe dans l’erreur de réduire les divers processus de développement ou de déclin à 
un schéma d’évolution plaqué. Certes, il y a des ressemblances entre les situations, mais chacune est 
particulière. (…) La ‘répétition’ de l’histoire est de l’ordre de la philosophie politique, c’est-à-dire des jeux de 
pouvoirs, dont Thucydide fait le principe de son analyse, mais non du cours du temps, chaque événement ayant 
son originalité.” 
19 This is the argument by which the Athenians, in V, 105, justify their desire to conquer the island of Melos: 
“Of the gods we hold the belief, and of men we know, that by a necessity of their nature wherever they have 
power they always rule. And so in our case since we neither enacted this law nor when it was enacted were the 
first to use it, but found it in existence and expect to leave it in existence for all time, so we make use of it, well 
aware that both you and others, if clothed with the same power as we are, would do the same thing.” (tr. C. F. 
Smith, op. cit.) 
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have had, not only in other matters, but especially as regards the plague.” (II, 61, 2-3, tr. C. F. 
Smith, op. cit., Καὶ µεταβολῆς µεγάλης, καὶ ταύτης ἐξ ὀλίγου, ἐµπεσούσης ταπεινὴ ὑµῶν ἡ 
διάνοια ἐγκαρτερεῖν ἃ ἔγνωτε. Δουλοῖ γὰρ φρόνηµα τὸ αἰφνίδιον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ τὸ 
πλείστῳ παραλόγῳ ξυµβαῖνον· ὃ ὑµῖν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐχ ἥκιστα καὶ κατὰ τὴν νόσον 
γεγένηται) 
Pericles and Thucydides insist here on the surprise of the change (τὸ αἰφνίδιον καὶ 
ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ τὸ πλείστῳ παραλόγῳ ξυµβαῖνον). It is not the negligence of men which 
prevents them from preparing, but the unpredictability of certain events, like of this disease. If 
time were circular, they could have seen the plague coming. Τύχη, “fate, fortune”, thus plays an 
essential role. The quality of a good leader consists in incorporating the unpredictable into his 
plans (Romilly 1966, 1990; Hunter 1973).  
We have thus in Thucydides the idea of time which follows a progression, even if it is chaotic, 
more so than that of a return or a repetition (Romilly 1966). 
4.3   Summary 
As different as they are, in both Herodotus and Thucydides can be found the notion of a long 
term and eternal time to which are opposed the time of men subject to change. Repetition or 
rather resemblance do not prevent progress, and it would be an error to attribute a notion of 
cyclic time to these authors. 
V   SYNTHESIS: TIME IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 
To conclude this first part of our analysis, we have a unified picture of the conceptions of time 
in philosophy and in history from the epoch of Classical Greece. We are thus in a position to 
compare them and see if they share a common evolution in terms of the preceding period. 
5.1   Comparison between history and philosophy 
Historians seek to describe events in which men are involved. They are thus by nature interested 
more in contingency than are philosophers, whose goals are broader. Still, it is possible to 
compare their thinking, as shown by Vidal-Naquet (19912: chap. 1) or Thein (2001: 174-78). In 
particular, we have seen that they agree on the observation that man is caught up in the flow of 
time and that there exists another temporality, longer lasting, in which he cannot participate, 
except indirectly.  
Let us pause for a moment and consider the latter, which can sometimes take the form of eternity. 
We may consider it as existing in two forms. The first escapes man, or at least he does not have 
access to it, except for by myth or speculation. This is cosmic or divine time. In a lesser way it 
is the time of immemorial or natural phenomena. In these terms, several authors have noted the 
particular status of Egypt, in Herodotus as well as in Plato. Indeed, while being located on Earth, 
Egypt does not seem to be subject to the effects of time. We highlighted the notation of 
Herodutus concerning the permanence of seasons in 4.1. This is also the case for Timaeus, in the 
dialogue of Solon, notably in 22e4-23a1, which is interesting in many ways and requires an 
extensive citation: 
“That story, as it is told, has the fashion of a legend, but the truth of it lies in the occurrence of a 
shifting of the bodies in the heavens which move round the earth, and a destruction of the things 
on the earth by fierce fire, which recurs at long intervals. At such times all they that dwell on the 
mountains and in high and dry places suffer destruction more than those who dwell near to rivers 
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or the sea; and in our case the Nile, our Saviour in other ways, saves us also at such times from 
this calamity by rising high. And when, on the other hand, the Gods purge the earth with a flood 
of waters, all the herdsmen and shepherds that are in the mountains are saved, but those in the 
cities of your land are swept into the sea by the streams; whereas in our country neither then nor 
at any other time does the water pour down over our fields from above, on the contrary it all 
tends naturally to well up from below. Hence it is, for these reasons, that what is here preserved 
is reckoned to be most ancient; the truth being that in every place where there is no excessive 
heat or cold to prevent it there always exists some human stock, now more, now less in number.” 
(tr. R. G. Bury, op. cit.) 
Tοῦτο µύθου µὲν σχῆµα ἔχον λέγεται, τὸ δὲ (d) ἀληθές ἐστι τῶν περὶ γῆν κατ’ οὐρανὸν ἰόντων 
παράλλαξις καὶ διὰ µακρῶν χρόνων γιγνοµένη τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς πυρὶ πολλῷ φθορά. τότε οὖν ὅσοι 
κατ’ ὄρη καὶ ἐν ὑψηλοῖς τόποις καὶ ἐν ξηροῖς οἰκοῦσιν µᾶλλον διόλλυνται τῶν ποταµοῖς καὶ 
θαλάττῃ προσοικούντων· ἡµῖν δὲ ὁ Νεῖλος εἴς τε τἆλλα σωτὴρ καὶ τότε ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας 
σῴζει λυόµενος. ὅταν δ’ αὖ θεοὶ τὴν γῆν ὕδασιν καθαίροντες κατακλύζωσιν, οἱ µὲν ἐν τοῖς 
ὄρεσιν διασῴζονται βουκόλοι νοµῆς τε, οἱ δ’ ἐν ταῖς (e) παρ’ ὑµῖν πόλεσιν εἰς τὴν θάλατταν ὑπὸ 
τῶν ποταµῶν φέρονται· κατὰ δὲ τήνδε χώραν οὔτε τότε οὔτε ἄλλοτε ἄνωθεν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρούρας 
ὕδωρ ἐπιρρεῖ, τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον κάτωθεν πᾶν ἐπανιέναι πέφυκεν. ὅθεν καὶ δι’ ἃς αἰτίας τἀνθάδε 
σῳζόµενα λέγεται παλαιότατα· τὸ δὲ ἀληθές, ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς τόποις ὅπου µὴ χειµὼν ἐξαίσιος ἢ 
καῦµα ἀπείργει, πλέον, 23.(a) τοτὲ δὲ ἔλαττον ἀεὶ γένος ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων. (Timaeus, 22c9-23a1) 
Solon explains that Greece regularly experiences destruction through the will of the gods, 
destruction which Egypt is spared thanks to the Nile (22d5-6). Exceptionally, this permanence 
wins over men by affecting their traditions (τἀνθάδε σῳζόµενα). Bodies, which undergo slow 
degradation after death, seem to be indestructible in Egypt as a result of mummification, as 
shown in in Phaedo, 80c7-d1 : ὅλον µένει ἀµήχανον ὅσον χρόνον: “[bodies] stay whole for an 
incalculable time” (passage cited by Thein, 2001: 163). The very long term, conservation beyond 
the succession of generational cycles, which surpasses the individual scale or the life of the City, 
recalls the character of the mobile image of eternity which Timaeus, in the physical and 
metaphysical order, also attached to time (see 3.2). Nothing in the history of men or of cities, no 
more than in the perceptible and perishable order of fate, can be identified as ἀεί, from the always 
and the immutable, a dimension reserved for νοητόν, to the intelligible. But the perennial aspect 
of fate constitutes a reflection of the eternal in this pure immutability, and a reflection which has 
a definite value, through its virtue of indicating an eternal world.  
 
If permanence – in principle reserved for gods and the heavens – exceptionally touches the 
Egyptians, for men there exist other ways of reaching a long or eternal term, to wit: procreation 
and the succession of generations, on one hand, and glory, κλέος, on the other. Procreation is 
explicitly given as a way of perpetuation in Symposium, 208a7-b4: 
“Every mortal thing is preserved in this way; not by keeping it exactly the same forever, like the 
divine, but by replacing what goes off or is antiquated with something fresh, in the semblance 
of the original. Through this device, Socrates, a mortal thing partakes of immortality, both in its 
body and in all other respects.” (tr. W. R. M. Lamb,20 Τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν 
σῴζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ (b) θεῖον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπιὸν καὶ 
                                                             
20 Plato in Twelve Volumes: Vol. 3. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann 
Ltd. 1925. 
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παλαιούµενον ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν οἷον αὐτὸ ἦν. ταύτῃ τῇ µηχανῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, 
θνητὸν ἀθανασίας µετέχει, καὶ σῶµα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα.) 
As the soul is immortal, but subject to being forgotten (see Respublics, X), it is paradoxically 
through the body that procreation gives man the means of perpetuating himself. 
 
The other way is also a substitute for perpetuation and also lays in others: This is immortal glory 
or κλέος. It may be literary, when one thinks of the famous κτῆµα ἐς ἀεί “acquired forever” 
which represents the work of Thucydides.21 But it is prototypically the exploit of the hero and 
actions of the warrior or politician. Whether we compare the verses cited in Symposium (208c5-
6) κλέος ἐς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ἀθάνατον καταθέσθαι: “[men desire] to give themselves an immortal 
glory for all time”, with the introduction to Herodotus’ Histories, which were written, among 
others, so that  
“Great and marvelous deeds done by Greeks and foreigners (…) may not lack renown.” (tr. A. 
D. Godley, op. cit., µήτε ἔργα µεγάλα τε καὶ θωµαστά, τὰ µὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι 
ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γένηται) 
Historians and philosophers agree on the facts that men cannot access eternity, or even the long 
term, except through the possibility of indirect participation. 
5.2   A progressive evolution 
This commonality in the perception of different times to which men are subject is probably 
indicative of a notion common to the time, which differentiates it from that of earlier thinkers, 
for whom the cycle was the preeminent mode of understanding time22 (see 3.1). 
Certain hints show that this cyclic conception of time endures at least in part in the work of the 
classical authors, in particular when Herodotus suggests that cities were large, and became small, 
while others went from being small to being large (I, 5), which implies that the reverse path is 
possible for everything, although this remains implicit and Herodotus seems to describe an 
unending mobility rather than anything else. In the text from Plato’s Timaeus seen in 3.2, objects 
subject to change and fate are “generated forms of Time, which imitates Eternity and circles 
round according to number” (χρόνου ταῦτα αἰῶνα µιµουµένου καὶ κατ’ ἀριθµὸν κυκλουµένου 
γέγονεν εἴδη). 
However we saw that the cycle, while present in Herodotus and Plato, does not predominate and 
its role is reduced in Thucydides and Aristotle. The metaphor of the circle is present in the work 
of many authors, it is a means of describing cyclic phenomena (ὁ κύκλος τῶν ὡρέων, “the circle 
of seasons”, Herodotus, II, 4, 4, τὸν ἐνιαύσιον κύκλον, “the circle of the year”, Euripides, The 
Phoenician Women, 544), but “that which comes back is the spring, or the dawn, not the whole 
of circumstances, of emotions, of events, which marked the past spring or yesterday’s dawn. The 
                                                             
21 See Raaflaub (2013) among a number of others. The theme is important in Herodotus as well (see Da Costa 
Guterres 2017).  
22 The distinction between cyclic/linear is somewhat of an outline. Later, we attempt to make the linear 
temporal determination more precise. For a history of notions of time founded on this distinction, but with all 
necessary nuances, see Pomian (1984). 
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cycle sings of human lives, but does not determine their course”23 (Romilly 1975: 142). 
Thucydides is taken by the idea if not of progress, at least of progression (Romilly 1966). 
In particular, there is no “return” or new-beginning, as we might expect in a cyclic conception 
of time, so much so that the role of the unexpected is important (see 4.2). Thus the political cycle 
evoked by Herodotus is present as well in Plato for whom cities undergo a predictable evolution 
from one regime to another.24 But this evolution is linear and above all unidirectional. For Plato, 
it does not involve a return to an earlier condition of the city (tyranny or something else). For 
Herodotus, that a large city might become small and that it might become once again large is 
never mentioned. In reality, there is confusion between the return of phenomena and time itself. 
“The periodic eruptions of waters and of fire seriously affect human time, but they cannot be 
considered to constitute it. (. . .) Human time continues despite cataclysms”25 (Thein 2001: 160-
61, voir aussi 56-57). In a final stage of this evolution, we saw in 3.3 that Aristotle distinguishes 
between cycles which measure time and time itself. So much so that the cyclic conception of 
time is, depending on the authors, secondary or absent in the classical period, as noted by several 
scholars (see Romilly 1975; Thein 2001; Golfin 2003; Vidal-Naquet 1991², among others). 
Employing the observation that cities may decline and lose their power or greatness and grow 
as a justification for his historical work in his Prooimion, Herodotus means to imply that they 
are subject to change. It is because everything changes and nothing stays the same that the 
historian is needed so that which moves and would soon be forgotten is fixed by his written 
work. A correlate is the consideration of the long term, that is to say the consciousness that men 
and lands have existed for a very long time, which allows the conception of an “open” time, in 
which seems rather to dominate the reign of τύχη and of happenstance, of the unpredictable, 
which is limited to a linear conception of time. The long term, measured in thousands of years, 
no doubt explains why Herodotus welcomes into his history – which is in principle rational – 
mythic accounts which are ahistorical or pure legend.26 This explains why he says, which at first 
is surprising coming from a historian: “Anything can happen over the long course of time.” 
γένοιτο δ᾿ ἂν πᾶν ἐν τῷ µακρῷ χρόνῳ, (regarding the Sigynnae, who live beyond Thrace, and 
who are said to have a Median origin, V, 9).  
We will now see that during the same period, there was change in linguistic categories used to 
mark time differently. 
VI   LANGUAGE 
In this section, we will show that the verbal system of Classical Greek underwent major 
evolution, which gives us an indication of how the Greeks of the period conceived of time. 
Ultimately, we will put these results into relation with what we described above regarding the 
history of ideas.  
                                                             
23 “Ce qui revient est le printemps, ou l’aube, non pas l’ensemble des circonstances, des émotions, des 
événements, qui ont marqué le printemps passé ou l’aube d’hier. Le cycle scande la vie humaine, mais n’en 
détermine pas le cours.” 
24 See also the famous ἀνακύκλωσις of political regimes in Polybus (VI, 9, 10). 
25 “Les irruptions périodiques des eaux et du feu affectent gravement le temps humain, mais elles ne sauraient 
être identifiées avec ce qui le constitue. (…) Le temps humain continue justement malgré les cataclysms.” 
26 It is in this way that he brings the gods into the midst of men, in a remote period of history (Darbo-Peschanski 
1987; Vidal-Naquet 1991²). 
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The Greek language of the 5th and 4th centuries saw a change through important innovations 
affecting the verbal system and the expression of time. Recall first that the verbal system of 
Ancient Greek is above all founded on aspectual distinctions. In other words, internal progress 
in this language is always expressed through verbal themes:27 the present (duration), the aorist 
(punctual), the perfect (stative-resultative). This crude description does not do justice to recent 
works, which have made the system more precise or amended (notably by using the 
perfective/imperfective categories).28 Still, the remark regarding the importance of aspect is not 
controversial.  
But if we look closely at the classical period, we realize that the situation evolved. The marking 
of aspects and modes being less precise, time29 stepped into the bridge. We will examine both 
by using an example of the perfect and of the optative. 
6.1   The Greek perfect in the classical period 
Indeed, as early as 1927, Pierre Chantraine argued that the perfect and the aorist merged during 
this period as markers of the past/anteriority. The Indo-European perfect, or rather the forms that 
gave rise to it, probably had a stative meaning.30 This sense is still very present for Homer31 as 
can be seen in the following example. The atmospheric conditions give rise to a state of joy in a 
shepherd:  
Οὐρανόθεν δ’ ἄρ’ ὑπερράγη ἄσπετος αἰθήρ, /πάντα δὲ εἴδεται ἄστρα, γέγηθε δέ τε φρένα 
ποιµήν. “From heaven breaketh open the infinite air, and all stars are seen, and the shepherd 
joyeth in his heart,” (Hom. Iliad, 8.557-9, tr. A. T. Murray32) 
From this stative sense, the perfect evolves to have a resultative sense, and from this resultative 
sense towards a sense of the simple past, as shown in this passage from Plato, cited by P. 
Chantraine: 
Εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἓν µηδαµῇ µηδενὸς µετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γέγονεν οὔτ’ ἐγίγνετο οὔτ’ ἦν ποτέ, 
οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἔστιν, οὔτ’ ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτε ἔσται. 
“If the one has no participation in time whatsoever, it neither has become nor became nor was 
in the past, it has neither become nor is it becoming nor is it in the present, and it will either 
become nor be made to become nor will it be in the future.” (Platon, Parmenides, 141e5-7, tr. 
H. N. Fowler33) 
                                                             
27 According to Comrie (1976: 1-6) aspect is concerned with “the different ways of viewing the internal 
temporal constituency of a situation”. 
28 Jacquinod et al. (2000) and Bary (2009) are particularly important in this domain.  
29 In linguistics, time is considered to be a characterization outside of process, the process described being on 
a temporal axis that is either absolute (that is to say, past, present, future), or relative (anterior, simultaneous, 
posterior), absolute time can be considered as a time relative to the moment of expression, (cf. Reichenbach 
1947; Comrie 1985; Vikner 1985). 
30 There is a consensus on this ancient idea, (see Wackernagel 1904 for example), although the details are 
treated in very different ways, in particular the role played by reduplication (Jasanoff 2003; Willi 2018: chap. 
5 and references). 
31 There is a complete study on aspect in Homer found in Napoli (2006).  
32 Homer. The Iliad in two volumes. Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, 
Ltd. 1924. 
33 Plato in Twelve Volumes: Vol. 4. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann 
Ltd. 1926. 
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In this text, the philosopher wonders about the permanence of being and unity. In order to explain 
that it is outside of time, he denies its creation and its existence in the three times he considers: 
the past, the present, and the future. It is worth noting that he uses the same form of the perfect, 
γέγονεν, both in the past and in the present (as shown by the verbs with which it is associated 
and the adverbs joined to them ποτε ‘in the past’ and νῦν ‘today’). This text from Parmenides 
shows us a pivotal relation whereby the perfect expresses the result (here, ‘to be created’ > ‘to 
exist’) and the past/the cause of this result (‘to have created’): “the perfect evokes more and more 
the notion of the past”34 (Chantraine 1927: 161). 
Chantraine describes this evolution in his conclusion: 
“the perfect had its definite place in the economy of the Indo-European verb: it expressed the 
acquired state; – in Greek conjugation, as soon as it took on a resultative value, this resultative 
value had the affect of being a mere accessory next to the present/aorist opposition firmly 
established in conjugation. By the fact that the perfect had received the construction of the 
present/aorist it was just short of being a double use of the aorist. Thus was its downfall. The 
language eliminated superfluous elements. (…) It disappeared because it could not adapt: thus 
is explained its different history from that of the aorist. Entering into conjugation it was pulled 
between the system of the present and that of the past; it tended here to take on desinences 
of the present, there those of the past: it provides thus a good example of a conflict between 
aspect and tense.”35 
The aspectual system of Greek then became poorer because the accent was no longer on aspect 
but rather on the tense in this verb form. 
6.2   The oblique optative as temporal marker 
The same kind of change can be seen by observing the oblique optative. It concerns the use of 
the mode known as ‘optative’ limited to subordinate and past contexts. The genesis of this use 
is probably modal: it indicates the taking of a position relative to some reported propos, in 
particular in the 5th Century (Basset 1984, 1986; Bary à paraître). But little by little its use 
extended to all kinds of subordinates. It became obligatory in subordinates in the contexts in 
which the event described clearly precedes the description itself (Faure 2010, 2014): it is thus 
grammaticalized as a mark of the past. Thus in the following example:  
Ἀπεκρίνω ὅτι τὸ στράτευµα διαϐήσοιτο εἰς Βυζάντιον. “You answered that the army was going 
to cross over to Byzantium” (Xenophon, Anabasis, 7.2.27, tr. C. L. Brownson36) 
                                                             
34 “Le parfait évoque de plus en plus la notion de passé”: This trajectory is similar to the process which gave 
rise to the “compound past” in the progression from Latin to the Romance languages (e.g., the French “passé 
composé”). 
35 “Le parfait avait sa place définie dans l’économie du verbe indo-européen : il exprimait l’état acquis ; - dans 
la conjugaison grecque, dès qu’il a pris la valeur résultative, cet aspect résultatif faisait l’effet d’un simple 
accessoire en face de l’opposition présent/aoriste fermement établie dans la conjugaison. Par le fait que le 
parfait avait reçu la construction du présent/aoriste il se trouvait à une nuance près faire double emploi avec 
l’aoriste. De là sa ruine. La langue a éliminé les éléments superflus. (…) Il a disparu parce qu’il ne pouvait pas 
s’adapter : ainsi s’explique qu’il n’ait pas eu la même histoire que l’aoriste. En entrant dans la conjugaison il 
s’est trouvé tiraillé entre le système du présent et celui du passé ; il a tendu à prendre tantôt les désinences du 
présent, tantôt celles du passé : il offre ainsi un bon exemple du conflit de l’aspect et du temps.” (p. 254) 
36 Xenophon in Seven Volumes. Vol. 3. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; William Heinemann, Ltd., 
London. 1922. 
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Διαϐήσοιτο ‘(it) was crossing’ is in the future optative since the action of crossing happened in 
the future relative to the response (ἀπεκρίνω ‘you responded’), but in the past relative to the 
moment of expression. The indicative is used if the future action relative to the past moment 
happens during the moment of expression:  
Ἐλέγοµέν που καὶ τότε ὅτι ῥᾷστα οἴσει τῶν ἄλλων. “We said, I believe, then too, that he will 
bear it more easily than the other sort.” (Plato Respublica, 603e5, tr. P. Shorey37) 
In this example from Plato, the action of support expressed by οἴσει was formulated in the past, 
but is still operative at the time of expression. In the classical period, the oblique optative goes 
thus from an exclusively modal value to a more temporal value. 
6.3   Summary 
The perfect and the optative provide examples of changes from an aspectual value to a temporal 
value and a modal value to a temporal value. The convergence of these changes and their 
simultaneity seem to indicate that the verbal system of Classical Greek38 underwent a 
reorientation based on the marking of absolute and relative time39 at the expense of the internal 
functioning of process and mode, which remained marked, but less precisely (the passage from 
a system with three aspects and three modes to one with two aspects and two modes). We still 
need to give an answer to the question of the influence of these changes on categories of thought. 
VII   CONCLUSION: CO-EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT? 
This study has shown that there seems to be a “Classical Greek conception of time”, to use the 
terms from our introduction, and that Greek thinkers of the classical period clearly distinguished 
between an eternal time, a long term and a human time, the latter of which could be measured 
by the second, and which could also be used by man to attain or have an image of the former. 
Though they were conscious of repetition, in particular of natural phenomena, they nevertheless 
do not conceive of time in a cyclic fashion. Rather, man is caught up in a linear progress, even 
a teleological one. One need only think of Aristotle and the development of that which is in 
potency in an object, development conditioned by time.  
Furthermore, the language began to use a more precise marking of time, with a new nuance 
marked by the perfect, and a sequence of tenses marked by the oblique optative (a change 
completed only in the 4th Century). As for aspect, although it survived, it was less precise, since 
the perfect disappeared.  
 
Finally, all that remains to evaluate is the hypothesis that we put forward in the introduction. 
There we brought up the works of Benveniste on the influence of categories of language on 
categories of thought. More recently, works such of those of Boroditsky (2001) suggest a similar 
influence. In this article, the author shows experimentally that speakers of Mandarin have a 
vertical conception of time and those of English a horizontal conception.  
                                                             
37 Plato in Twelve Volumes: Vol. 6. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann 
Ltd. 1935. 
38 The truth is that this change may be older and have its roots in the Homeric epoch (8th Century), where a 
better accounting of external chronology is considered (bearings relative to the present moment) with the 
establishment of a future and several morphologically marked pasts (Chantraine 1961² [19451]). 
39 The history of grammar gives independent motivation for this argument, see Berrettoni (1992). 
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For the period that interests us, we note a concomitant linguistic marking of absolute and relative 
time and the development of a linear notion of time, conceived of as a unidirectional conveyor 
of events. This can be explained in the following way: Taking time into consideration at the 
expense of aspect and of mode allows a clearer and more solid grasp of chronology. Thus, the 
progression of events in the past is now more precisely marked: We can distinguish a past in the 
past, a future in the past, a past which lasts right up until the present moment (the moment of 
expression), in opposition to an “absolute” past. The linearity of the flow of time becomes 
clearer. Indeed, aspect allows an event to be considered as a whole and to nuance the stages of 
internal progression of the process: It does not favor a linear or a chronological approach.  
The construction of time in historical narration follows a similar path. Indeed, in the Histories 
by Herodotus, the account is not characterized by linear composition, but rather an annular one 
(Immerwahr 1966; Beck 1971; Wood 1972; Golfin 1999: 146-155). Instead of advancing 
through linked series of events, it progresses through gaps or successive retrospective returns, 
from the most recent to the most ancient, according to what could be called “symmetrical way-
points” (following a structure of the type A – B – C – B – A). The historian is left to make 
“chronological connections” for clarity of the passing of events in the account. Yet it can be seen 
that the further one advances in the work, that is to say the closer one gets to the historian's 
present (the years 480-479), the more this construction of the account by “regressive 
composition” and “symmetrical way-points” becomes rare. For Thucydides, the chronological 
construction of narration is most important. The account has a linear progression, even if the 
regressive method is also represented, if only with the Pentecontaetia of book I (Golfin 1999). 
Such hypotheses regarding a concomitant evolution of language and the conception of time 
remain to be confirmed by the observation of other languages and civilizations. As we saw, 
human time should be the priority in this research, since taking astronomical, cosmic, or seasonal 
time into consideration biases perception, transferring into human time properties of the 
phenomena by which it is measured. Grammatically, it is clear that English or Romance 
languages have a very clear marking of chronology and that the dominant thinking concerning 
time for contemporary speakers of these languages is linear. On the other hand, despite the 
observations of Whorf (1956) on the Hopi language, linguistic typology has shown that no 
language in the world grammaticalizes a way of expressing, in its verbal system, temporal 
cyclicity (Comrie 1985), that is to say, has a verbal form for saying “this happened and is 
happening again”, to crudely gloss such a hypothetical verbal form. It seems thus promising to 
look at aspect, and to try to show the corollary of our hypothesis on chronology and verbal time, 
to wit that languages based on aspect tend to prefer a cyclic notion of time, as in certain Native 
American or Aboriginal languages. 
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